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I. Introduction 
 
Persons who suffer harm as a result of the negligence or malfeasance of the United Nations 
(UN) have nowhere to go to seek redress. There is no competent court to hear their 
complaints due to a combination of institutional immunities and individuals’ lack of standing 
to bring a dispute to the attention of an adjudicative body independent of the organization.2 
At the same time, individuals affected by the wrongful conduct of the UN have not usually 
been able to rely on their States of nationality to pursue claims on their behalf nor have 
adequate administrative mechanisms internal to the organization been established to ensure a 
modicum of justice.3   
 
The absence of appropriate fora to pursue claims impedes injured individuals from securing 
meaningful reparations. But it also results in a wider problem; it dis-incentivizes the UN from 
putting in place internal rules and policies that pass adequate legal muster. There is no 
independent judicial scrutiny of these rules and policies which are largely created in the 
organization’s self-interest. This absence of scrutiny can and has resulted in a denial of 
justice – taken here to mean an absence of a minimum standard of process by which a claim 
is independently and fairly adjudicated.4 It also creates an environment in which the policies 
that resulted in negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct are allowed to continue. There is 
insufficient learning from mistakes or meaningful steps taken to prevent recurrence. 
 
This article focuses on one part of this conundrum: the (mis)use of the principle of lex 
specialis to exempt the UN from its general obligation to account for and address fully the 
harms it causes. That the UN has such a general obligation to so account is a topic canvassed 
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elsewhere by a variety of scholars5 and those arguments will not be repeated here; this 
general obligation is also a sine qua non of the International Law Commission’s [ILC] 
framework relating to the responsibility of international organizations [DARIO],6 Article 3 of 
which specifies that ‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of an international organization 
entails the international responsibility of that organization’, and Articles 30 and 31 make 
clear that a responsible international organization is obligated to cease those acts that are 
continuing and afford appropriate assurances and guarantees or non-repetition if the 
circumstances so require, as well as make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act.  
 
The ILC framework focuses on the internationally wrongful acts of international 
organizations where the resultant obligations are ‘owed to one or more States, to one or more 
other organizations, or to the international community as a whole’.7 The text does not cover 
and is without prejudice to ‘any right, arising from the international responsibility of an 
international organization, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a 
State or an international organization.’8 Nonetheless, the Official Commentaries to the ILC 
DARIO text identify peacekeeping – which is the focus of this article - as one of two 
significant areas in which rights accrue to persons other than States or organizations;9 the 
other being employment claims. The Official Commentaries do not explain the matter in any 
detail, however elsewhere in the same text, the Commentaries make reference to the UN’s 
liability towards third parties under the model contribution agreement relating to military 
contingents placed at the UN’s disposal.10 Here, it is noted that under the model contribution 
agreement, the UN would be liable but has a right of recovery against the contributing state 
under certain circumstances. It is noted, however, having particular regard to the inability for 
a contract to impinge on the rights of third parties, that ‘this type of agreement is not 
conclusive because it governs only the relations between the contributing State or 
organization and the receiving organization and could thus not have the effect of depriving a 
third party of any right that that party may have towards the State or organization which is 
responsible under the general rules.’11  
 
This failure to address directly those obligations owed to individuals unconnected to the 
organization is consistent with the approach taken in the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility 
of States, which the DARIO largely mirror.12 Nevertheless, this limitation is unfortunate as it 
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has left open a window of uncertainty which has been seized upon by the UN as a rationale 
for derogating from the standards set out in the ILC text and elsewhere. This has been done in 
large part through the (mis)use of the principle of lex specialis. The Secretariat of the UN has 
underscored its view that ‘the obligation to make reparation, as well as the scope of such 
reparation, must be subject, in the case of the United Nations, to the rules of the organization, 
and more particularly, to the lex specialis rule within the meaning of draft article 63.’13 
 
As is described later in this article, the lex specialis principle maintains that the general law is 
inapplicable when there are more precise or ‘special’ rules that apply in a given situation. 
However, whether it can be said that there is any special rule governing the procedures and 
standards applicable to reparation for injury caused by the actions or omissions of the UN, 
and how far that ‘specialness’ extends, is subject to debate. It is posited that the general law 
on reparations for injury remains applicable to the wrongful conduct attributable to the UN at 
least for the purposes of filling any gaps or deficiencies in any special rules the organization 
chooses to put in place.  
 
The justifications for the UN’s lex specialis approach to reparations for harms associated with 
peacekeeping tend to stem from the special status accorded to the ‘rules of the 
organization’.14  It is well recognized that international organizations should be capable of 
setting internal rules to regulate their operations – the internal lex specialis of the 
organization - and that these rules should be subject to only minimal outside scrutiny.15 The 
rationale is to preserve the independence of the organization, especially where the application 
of domestic law by national courts where the organizations operate would be inconsistent 
with the organizations’ international status. However, there is a marked difference between 
setting internal rules to govern issues such as the employment of international personnel – an 
area which has an impact on persons who agree to contract with the organization and who 
have an understanding of the terms for so doing in advance, and in contrast, when an 
organization sets rules which determine the extent of its liability for internationally wrongful 
conduct and responsibility to afford reparations to individuals unconnected with the 
organization and who the organization is mandated to protect, that are negatively affected by 
such conduct.  
 
It is not unusual for a party to a legal claim to advance interpretations of the law that reflect 
that party’s interests and serve to minimize its responsibility. In a domestic context, this is the 
daily fodder of judges and courts; flawed arguments put forward by one side in a legal case 
would simply be dismissed or overruled in the ordinary course of proceedings. Indeed it is the 
job of the judge to see beyond self-interested embellishments or (mis)framings of the law. 
However, where there is no independent court with the mandate to adjudicate claims, the 
UN’s (mis)framings of the law are incapable of challenge. The more these (mis)framings are 
asserted without challenge, the more credence they receive – in this sense the ‘fake’ law 
progressively becomes ‘real’. But, this does not make those framings legally correct, just or 
appropriate.  
 
II. Resort to Lex Specialis in the UN’s Handling of Mass Tort Cases 
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II.1 The principle of lex specialis 
 
The Latin maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali sets out the principle that when two 
norms apply to the same subject matter, the rule which is more specific should prevail and 
be given priority over that which is more general.16 The maxim has been used both as a tool 
of interpretation to give clarity to a specific provision which might operate against a more 
general legal framework, and in other circumstances, the more specific exception is 
privileged to resolve a conflict or inconsistency between two legal norms which may be 
equally valid but are impossible to construe compatibly. The latter usage is premised on the 
understanding that parties (to a treaty, contract or agreement) are entitled to make special 
arrangements to regulate their relationship; in certain circumstances they may contract out 
of general rules of international law by subscribing to more specific rules to cover their 
situation.17  
 
In order for the lex specialis maxim to apply, it must be possible to construe a rule as 
‘special’, or ‘more special’ than another, and the two rules must both cover the same subject 
matter. This will not always be easy to determine, particularly when there is an 
incompatibility between two special regimes which may apply equally to a set of facts. 
Typically, treaties which bind specific parties would be considered more ‘special’ than 
general or customary international law.18 As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in 
its Nicaragua judgment, ‘[i]n general, treaty rules being lex specialis, it would not be 
appropriate that a State should bring a claim based on a customary-law rule if it has by treaty 
already provided means for settlement of such a claim’.19 But following on from this, if the 
special regime has gaps – for instance, if the special regime was not intended to be exhaustive 
or complete, or it nevertheless fails to adequately tackle all relevant issues such as for 
example, not providing ‘means for settlement of such a claim’, resort can be had to the 
general applicable law to fill the gaps.  Simma and Pulkowski refer to this as ‘a sliding scale 
of specialness’,  
one could conceive a rule at one end that is only designed to replace a single provision 
of the set of rules on state responsibility, while leaving the application of this 
framework otherwise untouched. At the other end of the scale, a strong form of lex 
specialis could exclude the application of the general regime of state responsibility 
altogether, either by explicit provision or by implication, that is, by virtue of a 
regime’s particular structure or its object and purpose. This latter concept of a strong 
lex specialis designed to exclude completely the general international law of state 
responsibility is what we denote as a ‘self-contained regime’. 20 
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The principle has been included in the ILC’s DARIO text,21 providing that special rules of 
international law, including the rules of the organization, displace the general ones.22 In other 
words, the ‘rules of the organization’ are considered special laws which regulate the affairs of 
the organization, which are potentially capable of displacing any general rules of 
international law which might otherwise apply.  The DARIO principle makes clear however, 
that it is not any ‘rule of the organization’ that may displace a general rule of international 
law. The rules must be ones ‘applicable to the relations between an international organization 
and its members;’23 ‘they may affect the consequences of a breach of international law that an 
international organization may commit when the injured party is a member State or 
international organization’,24 and may even ‘for instance, modify the rules on the forms of 
reparation that a responsible organization may have to make towards its members’,25 ‘but 
‘they cannot have a similar effect in relation to non-members.’26 This is, of course, because 
non-members have not agreed to be bound.  
 
The DARIO and its official commentary are silent as to the position of the ‘rules of the 
organization’ when the injured party is not a member State or international organization but 
an individual who is a national of a member State. Under classical international law, States of 
nationality can contract on behalf of their nationals on the international plane and take up the 
injuries of their nationals through diplomatic protection. But they are not obliged to do so, 
and in the case of nationals injured by the conduct of international organizations, they have 
rarely done so.27 The current position in respect of injured individuals not assisted by their 
States of nationality, and who have not voluntarily agreed to the special regime28 is not 
altogether clear.    
 
Koskenniemi notes that ‘[i]n regard to conflicts between human rights norms, for instance, 
the one that is more favourable to the protected interest is usually held overriding. At least 
derogation to the detriment of the beneficiaries would seem precluded.’29 Elsewhere he lists 
among several ‘concerns that may seem pertinent’, ‘prohibition to deviate from law 
benefiting third-parties, including individuals or non-State entities’.30 Arguably applying the 
UN’s lex specialis would frustrate the purpose of the general law, which is to ensure that 
victims receive adequate reparations. Injured individuals would be affected by the operation 
of the lex specialis31 and failure of the special regime could be inferred as a result of it having 
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‘no reasonable prospect of appropriately addressing the objectives for which [it was] 
enacted’.32  
There are several principles which may be drawn from the above. If there is no real 
inconsistency, the special regime will be interpreted in a manner consistent with the general 
law. If there is an inconsistency, a special rule or regime applicable between the parties may 
displace the general law. However, a special regime will not be capable of displacing the 
general law in respect of non-parties – persons or entities who have not consented to the 
special regime and are outside its purview. Furthermore, the general rule may continue to 
apply as between consenting parties to the extent that the special rule leaves gaps or 
inadequacies, such as the failure of the special regime to identify a remedial framework.  
II.2 The Reference to lex specialis in the practice and statements of the UN concerning 
reparations in mass tort cases 
 
As will be described, lex specialis has been referred to and applied by the UN in a number of 
contexts relevant to mass tort cases and is reflected in the responses of the UN’s Office of 
Legal Affairs and of several UN specialized agencies to the ILC Special Rapporteur on the 
DARIO text, in the lead up to the text’s adoption. These responses underscore the 
institutional commitment to ‘speciality’ to govern the relationship between DARIO and the 
respective ‘rules of the organization.’  
 
In the context of peacekeeping, lex specialis has been used to limit the types of conduct or 
scenarios which may give rise to a claim; restrict the categories of eligible beneficiaries; limit 
the timeframe during which claims may be filed; justify abridged administrative procedures 
for the handling of claims as well as limit the scale of recoverable damages. A scheme on 
third-party liability with significant restrictions on recovery was proposed by the Secretary-
General in 1997.33 It was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 199834 and has been 
incorporated into status of forces agreements and the terms of reference of local claims 
review boards established by the UN, ever since. Even when there is no direct reference to 
the lex specialis maxim, as will be described, there seems to be a general view within the UN 
that the only rules that apply to it are the ones created by it.   
 
II.2.1 Restriction on the types of conduct over which the UN can be deemed responsible 
 
Lex specialis – type arguments have been used to restrict the types of conduct over which the 
UN can be deemed responsible: only acts carried out in an official capacity and not for acts 
which were carried out because of operational necessity.  
 
An international organization incurs responsibility, so long as the organ or agent of the 
organization acts in an official capacity and within its overall functions.35 Consequently, 
narrow framings of what constitute official acts of the organization would limit the scope of 
acts for which an organization is responsible. The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) has clarified 
that official acts are ‘acts [carried out] in an official capacity and within the overall functions 
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of the organization.36 But, even if a particular act is not carried out pursuant to official 
functions, often the position of power vis-à-vis the local community engendered by the 
individual’s role in the international organization, particularly in a peacekeeping context, and 
in certain instances, access to weapons, funds, equipment or other means put at the 
individual’s disposal, might have made the commission of the unlawful act possible. A 
notorious example is sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in poverty stricken, 
vulnerable and conflict-ridden environments where food and money are bartered for sexual 
favours.37 A wider framing of official acts would be consistent with codes of conduct issued 
by international organizations, all of which make clear that proper comportment is not limited 
to particular contexts when an agent or employee is said to be ‘on duty’.38 It would also be 
more consistent with parts of international humanitarian law, which do not condition the 
obligation to afford reparations on whether the impugned acts causing the harm were 
‘official’ acts.39  
 
Lex specialis – type arguments have also been used to exclude liability in relation to third-
party claims resulting from or attributable to the activities of members of peacekeeping 
operations arising from ‘operational necessity.’40 Conduct which can be justified on the basis 
of ‘operational necessity’ – damage that occurs as a result of necessary actions taken by 
peacekeepers in fulfillment of their mandate – has been determined not to be capable of being 
adjudicated through a claims process, because, according to the UN, its ‘liability is not 
engaged.’41 This assertion of an exception to liability in the case of ‘operational necessity’ – a 
concept somewhat similar to the principle of military necessity under international 
humanitarian law – but which has been used loosely by the UN in an array of additional 
contexts,42 has also been justified in respect of peacekeeping on the basis that the 
peacekeeping mission is in situ to assist the host population who should bear the risk.43  
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 Similar to claims of military necessity, claims of ‘operational necessity’ should be assessed 
on the basis of proportionality. This is set out in a report of the UN Secretary-General, who 
specifies that whether “operational necessity” is engaged  
 
‘must remain within the discretionary power of the force commander, who must 
attempt to strike a balance between the operational necessity of the force and the 
respect for private property. In deciding upon the operational necessity of any given 
measure the following must be taken into account: (a) There must be a good-faith 
conviction on the part of the force commander that an “operational necessity” exists; 
(b) The operational need that prompted the action must be strictly necessary and not a 
matter of mere convenience or expediency. It must also leave little or no time for the 
commander to pursue another, less destructive option; (c) The act must be executed in 
pursuance of an operational plan and not the result of a rash individual action; (d) The 
damage caused should be proportional to what is strictly necessary in order to achieve 
the operational goal.’44 
 
The Secretary-General goes on to recommend that claims resulting from the ‘operational 
necessity’ of a peacekeeping operation should be excluded from the scope of competence of 
standing claims commissions.45 However, there is no independent process to determine 
whether the above-referenced criteria or any other criteria for determining operational 
necessity are met. Instead, a claim is simply taken out of consideration (by the UN) when the 
force commander on the basis of the exercise of his or her discretion determines that there 
was an ‘operational necessity’.46  
 
Beyond the above-noted limitations on the types of conduct that can result in liability which 
have been incorporated into General Assembly resolutions, status of forces agreements and 
the terms of reference of local claims review boards, there are additional de facto restrictions 
or barriers to liability. These are scenarios or contexts in which the UN simply decides not to 
submit itself to any form of internal claims process. Given the absence of an alternative 
forum to which injured third-party individuals can address themselves, these de facto 
restrictions constitute additional, virtually absolute, barriers to the resolution of claims.  
 
The first of these stems from the UN’s practice of distinguishing between claims of a 
‘private’ and ‘public’ nature, and deeming the latter category of claims to be ‘non-
receivable’. The UN has stated publicly: 
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The Organization does not agree to engage in litigation or arbitration with the 
numerous third parties that submit claims (often seeking substantial monetary 
compensation) based on political or policy-related grievances against the United 
Nations, usually related to actions or decisions taken by the Security Council or the 
General Assembly in respect of certain matters. Such claims, in many instances, 
consist of rambling statements denouncing the policies of the Organization and 
alleging that specific actions of the General Assembly or the Security Council have 
caused the claimant to sustain financial losses. The Secretary-General considers that it 
would be inappropriate to utilize public funds to submit to any form of litigation with 
the claimants to address such issues.47 
This statement in support of its own impunity underlies the organization’s approach to the 
‘private’ ‘public’ divide which has in practice foreclosed all major claims brought to the 
attention of the UN by third-party individuals.  
 
The non-receivability of claims deemed to fall outside the UN’s narrow conception of private 
claims was used to dismiss without consideration of the merits, Haitian claims that they 
contracted cholera as a result of the negligence of the UN mission in the country.48 Hovell 
refers to this as ‘little more than a formalist brush-off, with no firm foundation’.49 Philip 
Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights has gone further, 
calling the UN response ‘morally unconscionable, legally indefensible and politically self-
defeating’, … and one which ‘upholds a double standard according to which the UN insists 
that member states respect human rights, while rejecting any such responsibility itself.’ He 
notes that the UN’s OLA advice ‘has been permitted to override all the other considerations 
that militate so powerfully in favor of seeking a constructive and just solution. Its 
interpretations have trumped the rule of the law.’50 This decision to dismiss was taken by the 
UN without having submitted the matter to an independent claims commission as per the 
status of forces agreement that was in force for Haiti, and without agreeing to have the claim 
submitted to any other form of adjudication.51  
 
A similar approach was taken by the UN in response to claims from 138 members of the 
Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo who used to reside in the camps for 
internally displaced persons in northern Mitrovica. They alleged that they suffered lead 
poisoning and other health problems on account of the soil contamination in the camp sites, 
and that the contamination was known to the UN mission who did not take adequate steps to 
relocate them. Unlike the cholera example, however, in Kosovo there was a special chamber 
that had been established precisely with the mandate to assess claims concerning alleged 
violations of rights committed by or attributable to the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
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Kosovo.52  That body – the Human Rights Advisory Panel (HRAP) – had a wide mandate 
over human rights claims, though formally it was not competent to assess complaints that 
could be the subject of a UN third-party claims process,53 to the extent that such a claims 
process was capable of addressing the claim.54 HRAP determined the merits of the claim 
once the UN, through its third-party claims process, decided that the claim was non-
receivable.55 However, when it came time for the UN to comply with HRAP’s ruling finding 
the UN liable and recommending reparations, the UN declined to do so, basing its argument 
on its obligation to comply with the UN General Assembly resolution on third-party 
liability;56 acts it deemed not to be of a private law character were ‘non-receivable’.57  
 
In its final Annual Report, HRAP wrote ‘Due to UNMIK’s failure to follow the Panel’s 
recommendations, the HRAP process has obtained no compensation for the complainants. As 
such, they have been victimized twice by UNMIK: by the original human rights violations 
committed against them and by not receiving compensation through this process.58  
 
Following the issuance of this advisory opinion, Mr Zahir Tanin, the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIK issued a decision in which inter alia, he 
expressed regret regarding the adverse health conditions suffered by the complainants and 
noted the opinion issued by HRAP concerning the violation of human rights of the 
complainants and the recommendation to pay adequate compensation. He indicated that ‘… 
as the Panel is aware, the complainants’ claims for material damages have been assessed 
through the existing United Nations third party claims process. I have nevertheless brought 
these issues to the attention of United Nations Headquarters. I will also continue to draw the 
attention of competent United Nations bodies to these issues.’59 In May 2017 it was 
announced that the UN would establish simply a voluntary trust fund for projects to help the 
affected Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities in Kosovo.60 
 
This flawed ‘private’/‘public’ framing stems from Article VIII(29)(a) of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN (CPIUN) which requires the UN to make provision 
for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a 
private law character to which it is a party, when immunities would otherwise bar a claim 
before a competent court. The CPIUN deals with a number of limited scenarios and the UN is 
reading in to those limitations an absence of an obligation to address tortious conduct which 
it says falls outside those limited scenarios. But, responsibility is not limited to the few 
circumstances set out in the CPIUN; immunity does not impact on responsibility and the 
concomitant obligations that stem from such responsibility to afford reparation.61 Immunity is 
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simply a procedural issue about a particular court’s competence to hear a claim, it says 
nothing about the substantive liability of a subject, the right of individuals to access justice 
‘somewhere’ and the obligation on competent bodies to ensure that a venue to determine 
responsibility and reparations exists. Nor does it say anything about the responsibility of a 
would-be defendant. As the UN Special Rapporteur for Haiti has put it, ‘The United Nations 
should be the first to honour these principles.’62   
 
‘It’s not our fault’ – fault lies exclusively elsewhere: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
 
The second of these de facto restrictions is the insistence that some other entity is solely 
liable for the alleged wrongful conduct, even when the conduct arguably gives rise to 
multiple attribution of responsibility, a possibility recognized by the ILC Rapporteur on the 
DARIO text.63 Multiple internationally wrongful acts may arise out of a single act, with 
different elements being appropriately attributed to an international organization, a State or 
other entities.64  
 
Sexual exploitation and abuse during peacekeeping is a case in point and a pervasive issue 
that successive Secretary-Generals have committed themselves to addressing.65 These acts 
arguably entail both individual responsibility (individual criminal and civil responsibility) 
and institutional responsibility (to the extent that it can be said that the institution or body to 
whom the individual reports was negligent or otherwise failed to exercise due diligence to 
protect the local population from the foreseeable acts of those under its charge).66  
 
Whether the negligence or lack of due diligence is sufficient to qualify as an internationally 
wrongful act in accordance with DARIO framings, is not obvious. Nevertheless, wrongful 
conduct which takes place where the UN exercises effective control is attributable to the UN 
for the purposes of assessing institutional responsibility and the concomitant obligation to 
afford reparations. This is not a new or novel concept; it is underscored by numerous national 
and international courts,67 by the ILC68 and in the past was somewhat uncontroversial to the 
UN itself.69  If the mission is UN mandated, as opposed to simply endorsed or authorized by 
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Status of forces agreements focus on the criminal and civil liability of the formed military 
contingents and set out whether it is the host state or the troop contributing country that has 
jurisdiction to conduct investigations and which courts are competent to adjudicate civil 
claims.70 These rules have developed largely on the basis of applicable privileges and 
immunities. However, they do not fully capture the individual responsibility of UN 
employees and experts on mission who would only benefit from functional immunity and for 
abuses over which the organization’s joint and several liability is arguably engaged.   
 
In regards to institutional liability, as set out earlier in this section, these agreements identify 
a narrow subset of private claims which can be adjudicated against the UN mission itself 
through a standing claims commission;71 and the due diligence failings of the UN regarding 
sexual exploitation and abuse allegations or violations – just as is the case with the 
negligence of a mission for jeopardizing the local population’s right to health - do not feature 
among this subset. But unlike the right to health claims, the UN’s main argument has not 
been that the claims are non-receivable (though presumably it would use this argument here 
as well though it would be difficult to conceive of the UN mounting the argument that sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers constitutes a political or policy matter of the 
organization and thereby exempt by virtue of being ‘public’ claims); instead its focus has 
been to argue that others (and not it) are responsible for the various harms connected to 
sexual exploitation and abuse. What is clear is that the UN does not see itself as having any 
obligation to entertain claims concerning its own liability for sexual exploitation and abuse 
allegations which occur under its watch; instead, it has carved out a much more limited role 
for itself – supporting efforts of troop contributing countries to investigate and prosecute 
criminal allegations and encouraging states to address paternity and child support claims, and 
to ‘explore the possible use of ex gratia payments to victims’.72   
 
This position has been underscored by Jane Holl Lute, UN Under-Secretary General and 
Special Coordinator on Improving the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse. In response to a question posed to her about whether local claims review boards were 
being used in any peacekeeping mission to address claims emanating from the local 
population concerning sexual exploitation and abuse, she made clear that the ‘policy’ of the 
UN is that the individual abusers and the troop contributing countries are responsible to 
compensate; the UN’s ‘policy’ is that it is not responsible.   
 
the responsibility for acts of SEA rests with the perpetrators (A/RES/62/214). In line 
with this strategy, the UN endeavours to effectively prevent and respond to acts of 
SEA. A key element of these efforts is to provide assistance and support to victims of 
such acts. … Local Claims Boards are established in UN peacekeeping missions to 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Comments and observations received from international organizations’ (17 February 2011) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/637/Add.1,  p. 13 
70
 See, e.g., ‘The Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic 
of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (“SOFA")’, (8 August 2011) available 
at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/documents/unmiss_sofa_08082011.pdf, paras 44-47, 
50-51 (on criminal jurisdiction), 52 (civil liability).  
71
 Ibid, para 55 
72
 See, UNSG, ‘Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach’, (28 
February 2017) A/71/818, para 35  
review third-party claims for compensation against the United Nations for personal 
injury, illness or death, and for property loss or damage arising in connection with 
activities of members of peacekeeping missions in the performance of their official 
duties. It is noted that in his report (A/70/729), the Secretary-General urged Member 
States to receive claims from victims and consider the required mechanisms for doing 
so, and advise the Secretariat on this process.73  
 
How can an organization have a policy that it is not responsible? Even the most repressive of 
states tends to recognize the potential for itself to be sued for harms attributable to its 
conduct. This ‘policy’ ignores the potential attribution of responsibility to the UN qua 
institution in the context of the missions it leads. As elsewhere, it is impossible to subject the 
policy to independent challenge.  
 
II.2.2 Limitations on the ability to claim reparations 
 
A time limit of six months applies to claims for personal injury, illness or death, and for 
property loss or damage (including non-consensual use of premises) resulting from or 
attributable to the activities of members of peacekeeping operations in the performance of 
their official duties.74 The time limit runs ‘from the time the damage was sustained, or if the 
claimant did not know or could not have reasonably known of the injury or loss, from the 
time when he discovered it, but in any event not later than one year after the termination of 
the mandate of the operation.’75 The UN Secretary-General has justified the time limit, 
having regard to the national practice on statutes of limitation in tort cases, the procedures in 
place for claims submitted by military observers and civilian police monitors and others in 
connection with injury attributable to service with the United Nations and also taking into 
account the limited duration of peacekeeping operations.76 The Secretary-General has 
underscored: ‘the period of limitation established should be reasonable, practicable and fair to 
both potential claimants and the United Nations. It should be simple to administer, allow the 
United Nations to deal expeditiously with claims and be consistent with any relevant existing 
practices of the Organization in this regard.’77  
 
While it is natural that a time-limit should be set for most third-party claims, those claims 
which relate to issues other than the mundane, arguably require a differentiated approach. For 
instance, it has been recognized in jurisprudence that time limits for claims involving 
violations of human rights, trauma and victimization should be interpreted flexibly and 
capable of being extended, particularly where potential applicants’ vulnerability and feelings 
of powerlessness undermine victims’ capacity to complain without delay.78 Third-parties’ 
situations and potential vulnerability in light of the spectre of the conflict or post-conflict 
environment and the abuse of power inherent in the misconduct should therefore be taken 
into account. It has been recognized that for certain human rights and international 
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humanitarian law violations there should be no limitation period, and for others, the 
limitation period should not be unduly restrictive so as to inhibit claims.79  
 
Furthermore, the comparison with the procedures in place for claims submitted by military 
observers and civilian police monitors and others in connection with injury attributable to 
service with the UN [a four month limitation period] seems ill-judged. Third-party claims are 
different from claims emanating from staff and experts on mission, the terms of which are 
agreed by contract in which employees, and by extension their family members, are put on 
notice as to applicable procedures. Instead, prescription periods should be considered against 
the information the claimants receive about where and how to file a claim. Third-party 
claimants may have had no prior dealings with the UN and will inevitably experience some 
challenge in navigating the bureaucracy and administrative procedures of the organization. 
This is especially so given that a local claims review board may not have been established 
until well after the alleged incidents took place, and possibly only after significant pressure 
was placed on the mission by claimants or their advocates.  
 
II.2.3 Deviation from the DARIO standards relating to reparations for injury 
 
DARIO makes clear that the obligation to afford reparation arises automatically from a 
finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. There is no contingency to this 
obligation; it exists by virtue of the breach of the primary obligation.80 In addition, the right 
to reparation does not depend on the type of violation – any internationally wrongful act 
gives rise to an obligation to afford reparation.81   
The standard of reparations first articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) and which has thereafter framed the quantum and quality of inter-State claims is ‘full,’ 
as needing to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the status quo 
ante.82 The DARIO standards relating to reparations for injury replicate this approach; they 
make clear that reparation needs to be ‘full’,83 to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the status quo ante. The type of reparation that would be understood as 
adequate and effective will depend on the violation and the harm caused and may consist of 
restitution, compensation, and/or satisfaction.84 
In human rights law, reparation entails two aspects: the right to a remedy and the right to 
adequate and effective forms of reparation. Jurisprudence and standard-setting texts also 
recognise the need to consider the quality of victims’ access to and experience of justice 
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processes, including their access to adequate information,85 dignified treatment86 and respect 
for privacy and safety, both physical and psychological.87 This has been incorporated to a 
certain extent, into international institutional law – particularly when the only route to 
reparations is through an internal claims process (because domestic and international courts 
are largely foreclosed by immunities). There is some jurisprudence which has considered the 
adequacy of organizations’ internal dispute processes,88 and commentators have emphasized 
the importance for the alternate remedy to be capable of addressing the dispute, to be judicial 
in nature and that the adjudicators must be sufficiently qualified and independent.89  
 
DARIO makes clear that the ‘rules of the organization’ are capable of impacting the relations 
between the organization and its Member States and organizations,90 and indeed that such 
‘rules’ may ‘modify the rules on the forms of reparation that a responsible organization may 
have to make towards its members.’91 However, is the international organization capable of 
agreeing with its Member States on rules modifying its obligations on reparation, when 
injured individuals (as opposed to Member States) are the ultimate beneficiaries?  
 
Principles of fullness, adequacy and effectiveness have not framed the UN’s approach to 
reparations, despite the DARIO requirement of ‘full’ reparation for internationally wrongful 
acts.92 The General Assembly resolution on third-party claims sets out several financial 
limitations applicable to third-party claims against the UN for personal injury, illness, or 
death.93 These limitations specify that compensation is restricted to economic injury or loss 
(and not recovery for emotional or moral losses such as pain and suffering and mental 
anguish or for punitive damages) which are to be determined having regard to ‘local 
standards’ and the amount of compensation payable is not to exceed $50,000 USD. The 
resolution also provides limitations for property loss or damage resulting from, or attributable 
to, the activities of members of peacekeeping operations in the performance of their official 
duties.  
 
The limitations on claimant recoverability do not align with the overall purpose of reparations 
(which is designed to address the harm) and seem ill-judged for those claimants who had no 
choice about their engagement with the organization, unlike commercial contactors or 
employees. As Koskenniemi remarked in his ILC report on fragmentation, ‘[i]n regard to 
conflicts between human rights norms, for instance, the one that is more favourable to the 
protected interest is usually held overriding. At least derogation to the detriment of the 
beneficiaries would seem precluded.’94 
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 The reason for these limitations, as with other limitations applicable to the claims process, is 
to reduce the financial and reputational risk to the organization associated with a potential 
large number of claims involving significant harm to individuals, and to simplify the claims 
process. But it is the principle of lex specialis that underpins the legal justification for these 
deviations. As the OLA set out in its submission to the ILC on the DARIO text, its view is 
that both the process and the result of claims against the organization form part of its lex 
specialis, and as such, the special rules it has created should exempt it from having to follow 
any general ones.95 The range of limitations it has introduced ‘prevails over the duty to 
provide full reparation under draft article 33 [of DARIO].’96  
 
Some of the limitations concerning the quantum and quality of reparations are possibly 
justifiable on the basis of the limited subset of circumstances that the resolution covers – the 
very narrow iteration of claims of a private nature described and criticized earlier in this 
article. In other words, an argument can be made that ordinary claims relating to property or 
personal injury disputes could be resolved in an expedited, abridged fashion. This would only 
be the case, however, if there was some independent adjudicative body which was capable of 
addressing the claims which might fall outside the mold or where the claimants prefer or the 
circumstances require a more judicial process because of the particularity of the claim.  
 
Victims should have the possibility to opt out of a limited administrative process that does 
not take into account the full spectrum of their needs or rights. Some transitional justice or 
administrative claims commissions as well as mass claim settlement procedures afford this 
two-tiered possibility – go to the quick fix administrative system for the resolution of 
ordinary matters and use the courts for those matters which, because of their nature or scale, 
require a more precise, differentiated approach. The General Assembly resolution on third-
party claims provides no scope for a more individualized and independent adjudication 
process, even if it were to allow for a wider understanding of ‘private’ claims.   
 
In practice, any ‘reparations’ provided for harms falling outside of this limited subset have 
consisted of ad hoc ex gratia payments in which liability is not fully acknowledged, or by the 
establishment of humanitarian trust funds for the general benefit of victims and funded by 
voluntary contributions which take the form of charity – not reparations. For instance, in 
March 2016, a Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was 
established, to provide greater support to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN and 
related personnel. In the case of the cholera epidemic in Haiti, on 1 December 2016 the UN 
issued a qualified apology and outlined a two-track strategy: Track 1 focuses on intensified 
efforts to treat, control and eradicate cholera, and Track 2 promises to deliver “a package of 
material assistance and support to those Haitians most directly affected by cholera” to be 
developed in a victim-centered manner, including through consultations with victims. The 
UN Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund was established to generate and 
manage its resources.97 As part of Track 2, direct payments to victims were contemplated, 
though this aspect of the plan never came to fruition and the remediation plan, while ongoing 
never received the required injection of funds. Neither of these trust funds are intended to 
satisfy victims’ claims for reparation; instead, the funds support humanitarian projects 
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developed in some of the affected countries. Furthermore, these initiatives are not reflected in 
the regular budget of the UN. Consequently they rely on voluntary contributions from states 
and have been severely underfunded and as a result they have been unable to accomplish 
even their humanitarian mandates.   
 
Some might argue that the limited funding available to the UN militates against it having to 
fulfil its obligations to afford reparations when it is responsible for negligent or tortious 
conduct. The possibility that a large damages award could bankrupt it or further alienate its 
donors is real.  
 
The ILC introduced some elements of equity and reasonableness into its approach to 
reparations. For instance, restitution is only required if it ‘does not involve a burden out of all 
proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation.’98 Similarly, 
satisfaction ‘shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating 
to the responsible international organization.’99 However, the text never strays from the 
principle of ‘full’ reparation. Flexibility is introduced in how it may be achieved however 
there is no license to restrict the quantum or quality of reparation that is owed should the 
amount prove difficult on the wrongdoer.  
 
Article 25 of DARIO focuses on the use of the principle of necessity as a circumstance to 
preclude wrongfulness, not to preclude reparation in response to behaviour determined to be 
wrongful. To the extent that the failure to afford reparation constitutes its own separate 
internationally wrongful act, the principle of necessity is applicable.100 The commentaries to 
the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States indicate that necessity may enable a State 
‘for the time being, not to perform some other international obligation’,101 and thus it would 
not be a license to avoid reparation, at most to delay its implementation. However, in 
DARIO, the commentaries maintain that as a matter of policy, necessity should not be 
capable of being invoked by international organizations as widely as by States.102 In order to 
ensure that an international organization is able to fulfil its financial obligations, Article 40(1) 
of DARIO specifies that ‘the responsible international organization shall take all appropriate 
measures in accordance with its rules to ensure that its members provide it with the means for 
effectively fulfilling its obligations.’ This is complemented by Article 40(2), which specifies 
that ‘[t]he members of a responsible international organization shall take all the appropriate 
measures that may be required by the rules of the organization in order to enable the 
organization to fulfill its obligations’. Thus, an international organization should ensure that 
there are sufficient funds in its general budget to ensure that it can afford reparations to 
persons or entities who suffer harm as a result of wrongful acts attributable to it, or 
alternatively put in place adequate insurance schemes to cover such clearly foreseeable 
instances.   
 
III. Conclusions 
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In the few instances in which wide scale victimization has been alleged, the institutional 
response has been to refrain from accepting liability and opt for humanitarian assistance – as 
in the case of the Haiti cholera claims or the Kosovo lead poisoning, or to argue that liability 
lies exclusively with others – as in the case of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. 
But the UN’s own understanding of its obligations to afford reparations for harm caused by 
internationally wrongful acts attributed to it provides only a limited and inadequate lens 
through which to understand and assess the adequacy of those obligations.  
 
It is questionable whether UN practice has crystallized sufficiently to ground a lex specialis 
rule.103 While it might be possible for the organization and its members to agree rules to 
govern specific scenarios, and they have done so regularly, is it less legitimate and arguably 
ultra vires for it to develop abridged frameworks when the responsible organization owes 
reparation not to its members, but to injured individuals. The injured individuals have not 
voluntarily agreed to the special regime, even though their States of nationality may have 
done so. Arguably applying the UN’s lex specialis would frustrate the purpose of the general 
law, which is to ensure that victims of violations receive adequate and effective reparation. 
The ‘special’ law would prevent this from happening; failure of the special regime could be 
inferred as a result of it having ‘no reasonable prospect of appropriately addressing the 
objectives for which [it was] enacted’.104  
 
Even if it were possible to ground a lex specialis rule, arguably the rule has been misapplied 
by the UN in the present circumstances. The lex specialis principle is at its heart a tool of 
interpretation, designed first and foremost to aid in interpreting different rules compatibly. It 
is not intended to be a brusque tool to justify an approach in which ‘only our rules’ apply. 
The general law on reparations should continue to apply to the extent that the goals of 
reparations are not fulfilled by the ‘special’ rules. At its heart, the UN’s approach to mass 
claims has been to deny the possibility for reparations to the vast majority of cases – this is 
not an example of a special, more precise rule relating to reparations, it is an example of the 
absence of a rule. The general rule remains very much in place.   
 
It is time for the UN to develop more robust internal systems capable of addressing this 
lacunae. This could be done by introducing a two-tiered system: allowing local claims review 
boards to decide on a wider array of claims up to a certain financial threshold and established 
a centralized, independent claims mechanism to deal with more complex or costly claims. In 
the alternative, the UN should waive its immunity for claims to proceed before otherwise 
competent courts. The current standstill is contrary to victims’ rights and interests, but also – 
and equally important – contrary to the founding principles of the UN.  
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